Ideal equilibria in noncooperative multicriteria games

Pareto equilibria in multicriteria games can be computed as the Nash equili bria of scalarized games, obtained by assigning weights to the separate cri teria of a player, To analysts, these weights are usually unknown. This pap er therefore proposes ideal equilibria, strategy profiles that are robust a gainst unilateral deviations of the players no matter what importance is as signed to the criteria. Existence of ideal equilibria is not guaranteed, bu t several desirable properties are provided. As opposed to the computation of other solution concepts in noncooperative multicriteria games, thecomput ation of the set of ideal equilibria is relatively simple: an exact upper b ound for the number of scalarizations is the maximum number of criteria of the players. The ideal equilibrium concept is axiomatized. Moreover, the fi nal section provides a non-trivial class of multicriteria games in which id eal equilibria exist, by establishing a link to the literature on potential games.