Is the median voter a clear-cut winner?: Comparing the median voter theoryand competing theories in explaining local government spending

Citation
S. Ahmed et Kv. Greene, Is the median voter a clear-cut winner?: Comparing the median voter theoryand competing theories in explaining local government spending, PUBL CHOICE, 105(3-4), 2000, pp. 207-230
Citations number
32
Categorie Soggetti
Politucal Science & public Administration
Journal title
PUBLIC CHOICE
ISSN journal
00485829 → ACNP
Volume
105
Issue
3-4
Year of publication
2000
Pages
207 - 230
Database
ISI
SICI code
0048-5829(200012)105:3-4<207:ITMVAC>2.0.ZU;2-Q
Abstract
This paper attempts to test the power of the median model against the respe ctive strength of other alternate models based on redistributive, political -institutional and interest group theories in explaining the demand for pub lic spending in New York state counties during 1990, 1980 and 1970. To exec ute the comparison of the performance of median voter model with that of ea ch of the nonmedian voter ones, various nonnested tests such as J and JA te sts, N-tilde, W and encompassing tests have been employed. Results of the s tudy show that although the median voter model has a marginal edge over the rival models based on the alternative theories, it may not be relied upon solely when many other institutional, redistributive and interest group fac tors are also relevant for explaining public spending. The results of this study differ from those in Congleton and Bennett (1995). We do not find tha t interest group models are substantially weaker than the median voter mode l.