S. Ahmed et Kv. Greene, Is the median voter a clear-cut winner?: Comparing the median voter theoryand competing theories in explaining local government spending, PUBL CHOICE, 105(3-4), 2000, pp. 207-230
This paper attempts to test the power of the median model against the respe
ctive strength of other alternate models based on redistributive, political
-institutional and interest group theories in explaining the demand for pub
lic spending in New York state counties during 1990, 1980 and 1970. To exec
ute the comparison of the performance of median voter model with that of ea
ch of the nonmedian voter ones, various nonnested tests such as J and JA te
sts, N-tilde, W and encompassing tests have been employed. Results of the s
tudy show that although the median voter model has a marginal edge over the
rival models based on the alternative theories, it may not be relied upon
solely when many other institutional, redistributive and interest group fac
tors are also relevant for explaining public spending. The results of this
study differ from those in Congleton and Bennett (1995). We do not find tha
t interest group models are substantially weaker than the median voter mode
l.