Mueller on European federation: A reply from the perspective of Australianfederalism

Dennis Mueller has recently made a significant contribution to understandin g issues of federalism and confederalism in the European Union - from a par ticular public choice point of view. He furnishes an important and provocat ive discussion of the relationship between the decision-making rules embodi ed in a constitutional convention (or other means of drafting a form of uni on for constituent states) and the decision-making rules which will be cont ained in the constitution which is the outcome of that convention. However, Mueller's veiled preference for a certain ideal form of federalism for Eur ope tends to reduce the parameters of his discussion, and gives his article an unrealistic and narrow focus, despite its ambitious scope. The present article explores some of the latent complexities in the public choice analy sis and design of European integration, particularly by drawing on the wide r experience of working federations and theory of federalism, using the uni que and synthesizing Australian experience as a point of departure. It argu es that Mueller's analysis is biased towards the reduction of decision-maki ng costs of European governance, and thus undervalues the external costs th at may be imposed through excessive central government.