A number of European countries are reforming their pension benefit formulas
by adopting "notional" accounts. These accounts are used to determine indi
vidual benefits, but pay-as-you-go financing is retained. This paper addres
ses the belief that by choosing adjustment rules cleverly, notional account
s can provide automatic financial equilibrium in the short run. If this wer
e true, it would be a valuable advantage in terms of insulating the governm
ent budget from demographic pressures, while insulating the pension budget
from fiscal pressures. It is shown that notional account benefit formulas c
annot provide automatic financial equilibrium in the short run. The paper a
lso suggests that if indexing rules are chosen in a particular way, and sho
cks revert rapidly to a mean, the pension institution may achieve financial
stability in the long run. However, long-run stability is unlikely to be v
aluable because political interference occurs in the short run.