Direct realism and the analysis of perceptual error

The dominant approach in psychology to the explanation of human cognition i s information-processing theory, which is a version of the representative r ealist theory of knowledge, according to which knowledge of external states of affairs is not direct but rather comes about through the immediate awar eness of representations of such states internal to the knower. An alternat ive to information-processing theory that to date has received Little atten tion in the psychological literature is direct realism, which is the view t hat the external world, not a representation of it, is the immediate object of awareness. This article addresses a long-standing criticism of direct r ealist epistemology-namely that it does not enable a plausible analysis of perceptual error. That objection must be overcome if direct realism is ever to be entertained seriously as a means by which to account for the phenome na of human cognition. It is contended here that instances of perceptual er ror can be accounted for within a direct realist framework by reference to the notions lack of opportunity to cognize, and lack of ability to cognize.