Rkr. Thompson et Dl. Oden, Categorical perception and conceptual judgments by nonhuman primates: The paleological monkey and the analogical ape, COGN SCI, 24(3), 2000, pp. 363-396
Studies of the conceptual abilities of nonhuman primates demonstrate the su
bstantial range of these abilities as well as their limitations. Such abili
ties range from categorization on the basis of shared physical attributes,
associative relations and functions to abstract concepts as reflected in an
alogical reasoning about relations between relations. The pattern of result
s from these studies point to a fundamental distinction between monkeys and
apes in both their implicit and explicit conceptual capacities. Monkeys, b
ut not apes, might be best regarded as "paleo-logicans" in the sense that t
hey form common class concepts of identity on the basis of identical predic
ates (i.e., shared features). The discrimination of presumably more abstrac
t relations commonly involves relatively simple procedural strategies media
ted by associative processes likely shared by all mammals. There is no evid
ence that monkeys con perceive, let alone judge, relations-between-relation
s. This analogical conceptual capacity is found only in chimpanzees and hum
ans. Interestingly, the "analogical ope," like the child, can make its anal
ogical knowledge explicit only if it is first provided with a symbol system
by which propositional representations con be encoded and manipulated.