Managers of corporate parents and their Ventures have long been faced with
the question of how closely to tie the parent and venture. A close connecti
on may enable a venture to capitalize on the competencies and resources of
the parent. However, venture autonomy could prevent corporate inertia and b
ureaucracy from constraining venture growth.
The lack of consensus on this issue leads us to the first of two complement
ary research questions that we address in this paper: "What is the effect o
f internal strategic fit between corporate parent and its venture on ventur
e performance?'' We suggest that a tight fit is positively associated with
venture performance because of the venture's access to its parent's resourc
es.
Managers and researchers alike have often observed that growing enterprises
are dynamic entities. In the case of corporate ventures, this implies that
the relationship between parent and venture evolves over time. Our second
research question directly addresses this issue by asking: "Does the relati
onship between a corporate parent and its venture(s) evolve over time, and
if so, how?"
We identify two dimensions of the fit between corporate parents and their v
entures: relational and economic. A relational fit reflects organizational
culture and structure, while an economic fit is a function of the needs of
the venture and the resources of the parent. We develop a series of hypothe
ses and test them with survey data from 97 Canadian corporate ventures. For
the purposes of this study, we define success as the ability of a firm to
meet internal milestones on schedule.
We find that the degree of fit between a corporate parent and its venture d
oes affect the success of a venture, and that success is associated with hi
gh levels of awareness, commitment, and connection. Further, the relational
dimension of the parent-venture interface appears to have a greater associ
ation with venture success than does the economic dimension.
Our data support the idea that the parent-venture relationship is dynamic i
n nature as ventures in our Sample generally lessened their economic connec
tions with their parents as they matured (or vice-versa). We did find, howe
ver, that the relational bonds remained more or less intact. The exceptions
to general trends were an increasing emphasis on financial targets along w
ith decreasing CEO involvement as ventures matured Both of these findings m
ake intuitive sense. Greater financial independence is accompanied by great
er financial accountability. And, as a venture gains in both independence a
nd accountability, there is less need for the CEO to provide "air cover." T
hese two issues aside, the basic model of enduring relational ties and dimi
nishing economic ties was supported As well, the increasing accountability
is consistent with our expectation that a close connection is preferable to
high venture autonomy. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science Inc.