Evolutionary games and morality - Commentary discussion

The implications of game theory models of the evolution of strategies of ex change are explored with respect to the evolution of moral dispositions. I argue that dispositions to practice tit for tat strategies could have evolv ed, but the moral behaviours to which they give rise do not fare well on cr iteria of morality. Inasmuch as the strategy implicit in the Golden Rule is unconditional, it could not have evolved in environments containing strate gies that exploit it. However dispositions to invoke conditional principles such as those that prescribe that people cooperate with those they observe cooperating and shun those they observe behaving selfishly, could have bee n selected in some conditions and may have given rise to the evolution of i ndirect reciprocity. The key to the evolution of morality is discrimination in favour of cooperators and against cheaters and selfish individualists. The limitations of game theory in the explanation of human morality are ack nowledged.