Optimal standardization in the law of property: The numerus clausus principle

Citation
Tw. Merrill et He. Smith, Optimal standardization in the law of property: The numerus clausus principle, YALE LAW J, 110(1), 2000, pp. 1
Citations number
281
Categorie Soggetti
Law
Journal title
YALE LAW JOURNAL
ISSN journal
00440094 → ACNP
Volume
110
Issue
1
Year of publication
2000
Database
ISI
SICI code
0044-0094(200010)110:1<1:OSITLO>2.0.ZU;2-5
Abstract
In all postfeudal legal systems, the basic ways of owning property are limi ted in number and standardized in the sense that courts will enforce as pro perty only interests that are built from a list of recognized forms. In the common law, this principle has no name and is invoked only semiconsciously ; it is known in the civil-law tradition as the numerus clausus. This Artic le adopts this term for the corresponding understanding in the common law a nd advances an information-cost theory that explains the ubiquity and durab ility of the doctrine. The numerus clausus can be seen at work in a variety of areas, including es tates in land, concurrent interests, nonpossessory interests, interests in personal property, and intellectual property. This Article argues that the principle serves to reduce third-party information costs throughout the law of property. Because of their in rem nature, property rights give rise to third-party information costs in a way that contract rights do not Individu als trying to avoid violating property rights or investigating whether to a cquire them need to gather information. Those creating property rights will in some situations have too little incentive to conform to the most popula r forms, requiring a degree of mandatory standardization. As it operates in practice, the numerus clausus strikes a rough balance between the costs of frustrating parties' objectives on the one hand and the costs of complicat ing third-party information-gathering on the other. This Article demonstrates that this information-cost theory provides a bett er account for the numerus clausus than do alternative positive and normati ve views, including those based on network effects, sufficiency of notice, private standards, antifragmentation concerns, and the increasing importanc e of contract-based rights. Finally, this Article shows that, because it te nds to preclude judicial innovation in the basic forms of property rights, the numerus clausus acts as an institutional-choice mechanism that channels to legislatures the power of innovation in the realm of property rights. I n keeping with the basic information-cost theory legislative creation and a bolition of property rights is likely to lead to lower information costs th an would judicial entrepreneurship in this area.