Many jurisdictions have created external oversight bodies for police follow
ing problems of recurring misconduct and the failure of internal control me
chanisms. Questions inevitably follow about the effectiveness of the new bo
dies to detect and prevent abuses of power. One potential source of ineffec
tiveness is undue influence or 'capture' by police. This paper reviews deve
lopments in external oversight internationally and examines the issue of ca
pture in detail using an Australian case study of the Queensland Police Ser
vice and the Queensland Criminal Justice Commission (CJC). The question of
capture was assessed by analysing reports on significant issues involving t
he CJC and police. Cases of zealous enforcement of rules were apparent, but
the study identified a generally weak approach on the part of the Commissi
on to enforcement and direction. Crucial elements of the CJC's structure an
d functions have exposed if to capture; including a role in facilitating po
lice management, joint operations against organized crime, and reliance on
seconded police investigators. The available evidence did not confirm, a ca
se of direct capture, but there was evidence from audits of investigations
that police involvement in investigations and discipline contributed to a m
arked attrition of complaints. Weakness in oversight could also be related
to the combined effects of an appeasement strategy, an overly legalistic or
ganizational culture, and inadequate quality control. Practical measures ar
e recommended to improve accountability that have general application to po
lice oversight bodies. These include a clearer separation between police an
d the regulator, quality assessment measures, and exclusion of a facilitati
on role to allow the regulator to focus on police conduct.