Civilian oversight of police - A test of capture theory

Many jurisdictions have created external oversight bodies for police follow ing problems of recurring misconduct and the failure of internal control me chanisms. Questions inevitably follow about the effectiveness of the new bo dies to detect and prevent abuses of power. One potential source of ineffec tiveness is undue influence or 'capture' by police. This paper reviews deve lopments in external oversight internationally and examines the issue of ca pture in detail using an Australian case study of the Queensland Police Ser vice and the Queensland Criminal Justice Commission (CJC). The question of capture was assessed by analysing reports on significant issues involving t he CJC and police. Cases of zealous enforcement of rules were apparent, but the study identified a generally weak approach on the part of the Commissi on to enforcement and direction. Crucial elements of the CJC's structure an d functions have exposed if to capture; including a role in facilitating po lice management, joint operations against organized crime, and reliance on seconded police investigators. The available evidence did not confirm, a ca se of direct capture, but there was evidence from audits of investigations that police involvement in investigations and discipline contributed to a m arked attrition of complaints. Weakness in oversight could also be related to the combined effects of an appeasement strategy, an overly legalistic or ganizational culture, and inadequate quality control. Practical measures ar e recommended to improve accountability that have general application to po lice oversight bodies. These include a clearer separation between police an d the regulator, quality assessment measures, and exclusion of a facilitati on role to allow the regulator to focus on police conduct.