When one decides for many: The effect of delegation methods on cooperationin simulated inter-group conflicts

The study explores the evolution of decision strategies and the emergence o f cooperation in simulated societies. In the context of an inter-group conf lict, we simulate three different institutions for the aggregation of attit udes. We assume that: (a) the conflict can be modeled as an iterated Prison er's Dilemma played by two decision makers, each representing her group for a fixed duration; (b) the performance of each group's representative influ ences her group members and, consequently, her prospects to be reelected. O ur main objectives are: (1) to investigate the effects of three power-deleg ation mechanisms: Random Representation, Mean Representation, and Minimal W inning Coalition representation, on the emergence of representatives' decis ion strategies, (2) to investigate the effect of the frequency of elections on the evolving inter-group relations. Outcomes of 1080 simulations show t hat the emergence of cooperation is strongly influenced by the delegation m echanism, the election frequency, and the interaction between these two fac tors.