Deception and retribution in repeated ultimatum bargaining

This paper investigates the dynamics of deception and retribution in repeat ed ultimatum bargaining. Anonymous dyads exchanged messages and offers in a series of four ultimatum bargaining games that had prospects for relativel y large monetary outcomes. Variations in each party's knowledge of the othe r's resources and alternatives created opportunities for deception. Revelat ion of prior unknowns exposed deceptions and created opportunities for retr ibution in subsequent interactions. Results showed that although proposers and responders chose deceptive strategies almost equally, proposers told mo re outright lies. Both were more deceptive when their private information w as never revealed, and proposers were most deceptive when their potential p rofits were largest. Revelation of proposers' lies had little effect on the ir subsequent behavior even though responders rejected their offers more th an similar offers from truthful proposers or proposers whose prior deceit w as never revealed. The discussion and conclusions address the dynamics of d eception and retribution in repeated bargaining interactions. (C) 2000 Acad emic Press.