We evaluate a fundamental assumption of Lakoff and Johnson's (1980a, 1980b)
view that people routinely use conceptual mappings to understand conventio
nal expressions in ordinary discourse. Lakoff and Johnson argue that people
rely on mappings such as ARGUMENT IS WAR in understanding expressions such
as his criticism was right on target. We propose that people need not rely
on conceptual mappings for conventional expressions, although such mapping
s may be used to understand nonconventional expressions. Three experiments
support this claim. Experiments I and 2 used a reading-time measure and fou
nd no evidence that renders used conceptual mappings to understand conventi
onal expressions. In contrast, the experiments did I reveal the use of such
mappings with nonconventional expressions. A third experiment ruled out le
xical or semantic priming as an explanation for the results. Out findings c
all into question Lakoff and Johnson's central claim about the relationship
between conventional expressions and conceptual mappings. (C) 2000 Academi
c Press.