Self-deception and confabulation

Authors
Citation
W. Hirstein, Self-deception and confabulation, PHILOS SCI, 67(3), 2000, pp. S418-S429
Citations number
20
Categorie Soggetti
Philosiphy
Journal title
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
ISSN journal
00318248 → ACNP
Volume
67
Issue
3
Year of publication
2000
Supplement
S
Pages
S418 - S429
Database
ISI
SICI code
0031-8248(200009)67:3<S418:SAC>2.0.ZU;2-I
Abstract
Cases in which people are self-deceived seem to require that the person hol d two contradictory beliefs, something which appears to be impossible or im plausible. A phenomenon seen in some brain-damaged patients known as confab ulation (roughly, an ongoing tendency to make false utterances without inte nt to deceive) can shed light on the problem of self-deception. The conflic t is not actually between two beliefs, but between two representations, a ' conceptual' one and an 'analog' one. In addition, confabulation yields valu able clues about the structure of normal human knowledge-gathering processe s.