Is the object of metaphysics the same for Heidegger and Thomas Aquinas?

According to a common interpretation, Thomas Aquinas and Martin Heidegger, though moved by opposing philosophical ambitions and having very different conceptual tools, arrived nonetheless at the same fundamental intuition: th at of ontological difference, and of its importance in metaphysics. Aquinas is therefore not guilty of confusing esse with ens, for which the German p hilosopher had reproached him. By analyzing Heideggerian texts dating essen tially from the years 1930-1950, together with a representative sampling of Thomist texts, the A. would like to show that Aquinas' ontology of which H eidegger had apparently not understood the specificity nor the originality, belongs just the same to the history of Metaphysics as characterized by He idegger and such as he would have us go beyond it.