The Internet relies on an underlying centralized hierarchy built into the d
omain name system (DNS) to control the routing for the vast majority of Int
ernet traffic At its heart is a single data file, known as the "root." Cont
rol of the root provides singular power in cyber-space.
This Article first describes how the United States government found itself
in control of the root. It then describes how, in an attempt to meet concer
ns that the United States could so dominate an Internet chokepoint, the U.S
. Department of Commerce (DoC) summoned into being the Internet Corporation
for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), a formally private nonprofit Calif
ornia corporation. DoC then signed contracts with ICANN in order to clothe
it with most of the U.S. government's power over the DNS, and convinced oth
er parties to recognize ICANN's authority. ICANN then took regulatory actio
ns that the U.S. Department of Commerce was unable or unwilling to make its
elf including the imposition on all registrants of Internet addresses of an
idiosyncratic set of arbitration rules and procedures that benefit third-p
arty trademark holders.
Professor Froomkin then argues that the use of ICANN to regulate in the ste
ad of an executive agency violates fundamental values and policies designed
to ensure democratic control over the use of government power, and sets a
precedent that risks being expanded into other regulatory activities. He ar
gues that DoC's use of ICANN to make rules either violates the APA's requir
ement for notice and comment in rulemaking and judicial review, or it viola
tes the Constitution's nondelegation doctrine. Professor Froomkin reviews p
ossible alternatives to ICANN, and ultimately proposes a decentralized stru
cture in which the namespace of the DNS is spread out over a transnational
group of "policy partners" with DoC.