Aj. Siegel, Setting limits on judicial scientific, technical, and other specialized fact-finding in the new millennium, CORNELL L R, 86(1), 2000, pp. 167-214
In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, the Supreme Court significantly broadened
the scope of the judicial gatekeeping role previously set forth in Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., holding that federal district judges
must ensure that all admitted scientific, technical and other specialized e
xpert testimony is both relevant and reliable. Faced with the challenge of
making scientifically, technically, and legally sound admissibility determi
nations, many generalist trial judges will inevitably be tempted to educate
themselves on the nature and substance of the complex matters requiring th
eir attention. While some judges may rely on court-appointed technical advi
sors, scientific reference manuals, or privately sponsored judicial seminar
s for assistance, other judges may venture into cyberspace, review scientif
ic journal articles not presented by the parties, or consult colleagues off
the record. However, the extent to which judges can properly engage in suc
h practices has become a matter of great debate and uncertainty due to the
divergent teachings of Kumho, the Code of Conduct for United States judges,
28 U.S.C. 144 and 455 (the federal judicial disqualification statutes), an
d the Federal Rules of Evidence.
In his Note, the author examines the recently broadened scope of the judici
al gatekeeping role in light of the competing ethical and legislative force
s that seek to limit a judge's active involvement in the scientific, techni
cal, and other specialized fact-finding process. The author argues that the
Judicial Conference of the United States, Congress, and the Supreme Court
should modify the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, 28 U.S.C. 455,
and Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) to prohibit sua sponte, ex parte commun
ications by judges who seek to acquire case-specific scientific, technical,
or other specialized evidence not presented by the patties. The author con
tends that peen if such independent factual inquiries by judges may increas
e the likelihood of "correct" admissibility determinations, such activities
run counter to the spirit of our judical system, which encourages the vigo
rous adversarial presentation of evidence and affords all parties unbiased
and impartial gatekeepers.