How to eliminate illusions in quantified reasoning

Citation
Yr. Yang et Pn. Johnson-laird, How to eliminate illusions in quantified reasoning, MEM COGNIT, 28(6), 2000, pp. 1050-1059
Citations number
15
Categorie Soggetti
Psycology
Journal title
MEMORY & COGNITION
ISSN journal
0090502X → ACNP
Volume
28
Issue
6
Year of publication
2000
Pages
1050 - 1059
Database
ISI
SICI code
0090-502X(200009)28:6<1050:HTEIIQ>2.0.ZU;2-T
Abstract
The mental model theory postulates that reasoners build models of situation s described in premises. These models normally make explicit only what is t rue according to the premises. The theory has an unexpected consequence. It predicts the existence of illusions in inferences: Certain inferences shou ld have compelling but erroneous conclusions. Previous studies have corrobo rated the existence of such illusions. The present study reports the first effective antidote to them. For example, most people incorrectly answer "ye s" to the following problem: Only one of the following statements is true.. ./At least some of the plastic beads are not red./None of the plastic beads are red./Is it possible that none of the red beads are plastic In two expe riments, we progressively eliminated this fallacy and others by using instr uctions designed to overcome the bias toward truth. The difference between the illusory and the control problems disappeared when the participants wer e instructed to work out both the case in which the first premise was true and the second premise was false and the case in which the second premise w as true and the first premise was false.