Lame-duck politics: Impending departure and the votes on impeachment

One of the peculiarities of the December 1998 votes in the House of Represe ntatives to impeach Bill Clinton was that they took place during a lame-duc k session. Roughly 10 percent of the voting population were in their final term and therefore no longer faced any risk of electoral retribution by the citizenry. While most of the relevant empirical literature suggests that t he absence of electoral discipline does not matter, in theory, these depart ing legislators could ignore the preferences of their districts and vote ac cording to their own personal preferences, the wishes of special interests, their new constituencies when relevant, or any other idiosyncratic factor. Because the votes on impeachment are so politically important, and since t hey offer an exceptional opportunity to examine the so-called last term pro blem, our analysis explores whether the factors influencing the votes of de parting members of Congress were different than those influencing the votes of their continuing colleagues. We And that, contrary to past findings reg arding political shirking, those leaving the House exhibited contrasting be havioral patterns relative to those who were continuing in the 106th Congre ss. In deciding their vote choices on the impeachment articles, reelected i ncumbents weighted district preferences far more heavily than departing mem bers. Consequently, our results suggest that the severing of electoral ties is relevant for legislator behavior and that it is a matter of some import ance whether or not a vote takes place during a lame-duck session.