Voters and the personal vote: A counterfactual simulation

Electoral formulas and campaign practices in some nations encourage voters to consider the personal qualifications of candidates for legislative offic e, whereas individuating information about candidates is unavailable to vot ers in other nations. Where electoral rules and elite behavior foster the p ersonal vote, the personal vote nourishes. However, it is unclear why voter s respond to personal information about candidates. We test two competing h ypotheses: that the personal vote reflects a general human tendency to atte nd to information regarding individuals' personal qualifications; and that the personal vote is an acquired behavior that emerges after voters are soc ialized to attend to personal information about candidates. We use counterf actual simulations to test these hypotheses. Specifically, we conduct labor atory experiments in which subjects drawn from Mexico and Venezuela-nations in which electoral rules ensure that the personal vote does not flourish-a re provided the opportunity to consider candidates' personal qualifications . Results are consistent with the hypothesis that the personal vote stems f rom a general tendency in human decision making.