A metaphilosophical analysis of the core idea of deflationism

Authors
Citation
B. Mou, A metaphilosophical analysis of the core idea of deflationism, METAPHILOS, 31(3), 2000, pp. 262-286
Citations number
34
Categorie Soggetti
Philosiphy
Journal title
METAPHILOSOPHY
ISSN journal
00261068 → ACNP
Volume
31
Issue
3
Year of publication
2000
Pages
262 - 286
Database
ISI
SICI code
0026-1068(200004)31:3<262:AMAOTC>2.0.ZU;2-3
Abstract
In this paper, I give a metaphilosophical analysis of the core idea of defl ationism by discussing some basic conceptual and methodological issues invo lved in the debate between deflationism and substantivism. In so doing, I a rgue for three positive points. First, the crux of the dispute between defl ationism and substantivism is whether or not truth is substantive in its me taphysical nature and in its explanatory role in philosophical enterprises, rather than whether or not a minimal approach regarding conceptual resourc es is taken to explain truth; a minimal approach itself is philosophically innocent. Second, there is no intrinsic connection between the core idea of deflationism and the Tarski-style equivalence thesis, which is often ident ified as implying or supporting the former. Third, there are some unbridged fundamental gaps between the core idea of deflationism and various redunda ncy theses; these redundancy theses cannot be identified as the former, nor can they be used to justify the former on their own.