A metaphilosophical analysis of the core idea of deflationism

In this paper, I give a metaphilosophical analysis of the core idea of defl ationism by discussing some basic conceptual and methodological issues invo lved in the debate between deflationism and substantivism. In so doing, I a rgue for three positive points. First, the crux of the dispute between defl ationism and substantivism is whether or not truth is substantive in its me taphysical nature and in its explanatory role in philosophical enterprises, rather than whether or not a minimal approach regarding conceptual resourc es is taken to explain truth; a minimal approach itself is philosophically innocent. Second, there is no intrinsic connection between the core idea of deflationism and the Tarski-style equivalence thesis, which is often ident ified as implying or supporting the former. Third, there are some unbridged fundamental gaps between the core idea of deflationism and various redunda ncy theses; these redundancy theses cannot be identified as the former, nor can they be used to justify the former on their own.