Iceberg epistemology (Belief, conflicting epistemologies, internalism, coherentism)

Accounts of what it is for an agent to be justified in holding a belief com monly carry commitments concerning what cognitive processes can and should be like. A concern for the plausibility of such commitments leads to a mult i-faceted epistemology in which elements of traditionally conflicting epist emologies are vindicated within a single epistemological account. The acces sible and articulable states that have been the exclusive focus of much epi stemology must constitute only a proper subset of epistemologically relevan t processing. The interaction of such states looks rather contextualist. It might also be called quasi-foundationalist. However, in attending to our e pistemological tasks we must rely on processing that is sensitive to inform ation that we could not articulate, that is not accessible in the standard internalist sense. When focusing on the full range of epistemologically imp ortant processes, the structure of what makes for justification is rather m ore like that envisioned by some coherentists.