Legal validity as doxastic obligation: From definition to normativity

The paper argues for viewing legal validity as a doxastic obligation, i.e. as the obligation to accept a rule in legal reasoning. This notion of legal validity is shown to be both sufficient for the laywers' needs and neutral in regard to various theories of the grounds of validity, i.e. theories in tended to identify what rules are legally valid, by proposing different gro unds for attributing validity. All of these theories, rather then being alt ernative definitions of validity, presuppose the notion here provided. This notion is purely normative, but it allows for the construction of theo ries of the grounds of validity which give due importance to social expecta tions and institutions. As an example of how this may happen, one such theo ry is also provided. This theory, which is presented through a detailed exa mple of a judicial debate, is based upon the recognition of the (instrument al) value of co-ordination, as the necessary way to achieve the most valuab le purposes of the law.