Jm. Brooks et al., HOSPITAL-INSURER BARGAINING - AN EMPIRICAL-INVESTIGATION OF APPENDECTOMY PRICING, Journal of health economics, 16(4), 1997, pp. 417-434
Employers' increased sensitivity to health care costs has forced insur
ers to seek ways to lower costs through effective bargaining with prov
iders. What factors determine the prices negotiated between hospitals
and insurers? The hospital-insurer interaction is captured in the cont
ext of a bargaining model, in which the gains from bargaining are expl
icitly defined. Appendectomy was chosen because it is a well-defined p
rocedure with little clinical variation. Our results show that certain
hospital institutional arrangements (e.g. hospital affiliations), HMO
penetration, and greater hospital concentration improve hospitals' ba
rgaining position. Furthermore, hospitals' bargaining effectiveness ha
s diminished over time and Varies across states. (C) 1997 Elsevier Sci
ence B.V.