HOSPITAL-INSURER BARGAINING - AN EMPIRICAL-INVESTIGATION OF APPENDECTOMY PRICING

Citation
Jm. Brooks et al., HOSPITAL-INSURER BARGAINING - AN EMPIRICAL-INVESTIGATION OF APPENDECTOMY PRICING, Journal of health economics, 16(4), 1997, pp. 417-434
Citations number
24
Categorie Soggetti
Heath Policy & Services",Economics
Journal title
ISSN journal
01676296
Volume
16
Issue
4
Year of publication
1997
Pages
417 - 434
Database
ISI
SICI code
0167-6296(1997)16:4<417:HB-AEO>2.0.ZU;2-S
Abstract
Employers' increased sensitivity to health care costs has forced insur ers to seek ways to lower costs through effective bargaining with prov iders. What factors determine the prices negotiated between hospitals and insurers? The hospital-insurer interaction is captured in the cont ext of a bargaining model, in which the gains from bargaining are expl icitly defined. Appendectomy was chosen because it is a well-defined p rocedure with little clinical variation. Our results show that certain hospital institutional arrangements (e.g. hospital affiliations), HMO penetration, and greater hospital concentration improve hospitals' ba rgaining position. Furthermore, hospitals' bargaining effectiveness ha s diminished over time and Varies across states. (C) 1997 Elsevier Sci ence B.V.