The world trade constitution

Conventional wisdom holds that the World Trade Organization (WTO) necessari ly poses a threat to sovereignty and representative government within its m ember nations. Professors McGinnis and Movsesian refute this view They argu e that the WTO can be understood as a constitutive structure that, by reduc ing the power of protectionist interest groups, can simultaneously promote international trade and domestic democracy. Indeed, in promoting both free trade and accountable government, the WTO reflects many of the insights tha t inform our own Madisonian Constitution. Professors McGinnis and Movsesian reject recent proposals to grant the WTO regulatory authority, endorsing i nstead the WTO's limited adjudicative power as the better means to resolve the difficult problem of covert protectionism. They develop a series of pro cedure-oriented tests that Mould permit WTO tribunals to invalidate covert protectionism without supplanting national judgments on label; environmenta l, health, and safety policies. Finally they demonstrate that the WTO's eme rging approach to the problem of covert protectionism largely comports with the democracy-reinforcing jurisprudence they recommend, and they offer som e suggestions for reforms that would help prevent the organization from goi ng astray in the future.