Functionalism and self-consciousness

Authors
Citation
M. Mccullagh, Functionalism and self-consciousness, MIND LANG, 15(5), 2000, pp. 481-499
Citations number
8
Categorie Soggetti
Psycology
Journal title
MIND & LANGUAGE
ISSN journal
02681064 → ACNP
Volume
15
Issue
5
Year of publication
2000
Pages
481 - 499
Database
ISI
SICI code
0268-1064(200011)15:5<481:FAS>2.0.ZU;2-X
Abstract
I offer a philosophically well-motivated work-around for a problem that Geo rge Bealer ('Self-consciousness', Philosophical Review v. 106, 1997) has id entified, which he claims is fatal to functionalism. The problem concerns h ow to generate a satisfactory Ramsey sentence of a psychological theory in which mental predicates occur within the scopes of other mental predicates. My central claim is that the functional roles in terms of which a creature capable of self-consciousness identifies her own mental states must be rol es that items could play within creatures whose psychology is less complex than her own.