The enumerative character of Tarski's definition of truth and its general character in a Tarskian system

In this paper, I suggest an approach to the alleged problem with the Tarski an formal definition of truth: its enumerative character seems to make it u nable to capture our pretheoretic general understanding of truth. For this purpose, after spelling out two requirements for extending an enumerative d efinition to new cases, I examine to what extent Tarski's Convention T prov ides what are needed for extending the Tarski's enumerative definition. I c onclude that, though not explicitly providing what are needed, Convention T does implicitly suggest something quite promising and provide necessary co nceptual resources for its further modifications. Then I suggest a Tarskian explicitly general definition of what it is to be a truth-definition on th e basis of some theoretical and conceptual resources within Tarski's semant ic theory, and I explain how it would make the Tarskian seemingly enumerati ve formal definition have a general character in accord with our pretheoret ic understanding of truth. Finally, I examine the current proposal in compa rison with Davidson's approach and in the light of Hintikka's new perspecti ve.