On some theoretical grounds for an organism-centered biology: Property emergence, supervenience, and downward causation

In this paper, we investigate some theoretical grounds for bridging the gap between an organism-centered biology and the chemical basis of biological explanation, as expressed in the prevailing molecular perspective in biolog ical research. First, we present a brief survey of the role of the organism concept in biological thought. We advance the claim that emergentism (with its fundamental tenets: ontological physicalism, qualitative novelty, prop erty emergence, theory of levels, irreducibility of the emergents, and down ward causation) can provide a metaphysical basis for a coherent sort of org anicism. Downward causation (DC) is the key notion in emergentist philosoph y, as shown by the tension between the aspects of dependence and nonreducib ility in the concept of supervenience, preferred by many philosophers to em ergence as a basis for nonreductive physicalism. As supervenience physicali sm does not lead, arguably to a stable nonreductive physicalist account, we maintain that a philosophical alternative worthy of investigation is that of a combination of supervenience and property emergence in the formulation of such a stance. Taking as a starting-point O'CoImor's definition of an e mergent property we discuss how a particular interpretation of downward cau sation (medium DC), inspired by Aristotelian causal modes, results in an ex planation of property emergence compatible with both physicalism and non-re ductionism. In this account of emergence, one may claim that biology, as a science of living organization, is and remains a science of the organism, e ven if completely explained by the laws of chemistry. We conclude the paper with a new definition of an emergent property.