Quasi-realism, sensibility theory, and ethical relativism

This paper is a reply to Simon Blackburn's 'Is Objective Moral Justificatio n Possible on a Quasi-realist Foundation?' Inquiry 42 (1999), pp. 213-28. B lackburn attempts to show how his version of non-cognitivism - quasi-realis t projectivism - can evade the threat of ethical relativism, the thought th at all ways of living are as ethically good as each other and every ethical judgment is as ethically true as any other. He further attempts to show th at his position is superior in this respect to, amongst other accounts, sen sibility theory (or 'secondary quality' theory). According to Blackburn, se nsibility theory succumbs easily to the relativistic challenge because it d epends on some 'substantive' notion of truth. It is agreed with Blackburn t hat the threat of relativism is less of a threat to him than at first appea rs, although I think that it retains some menace, but not agreed that sensi bility theorists cannot also counter the threat of relativism (although, ag ain, ethical relativism retains some menace in the face of the sensibility theorist's reply). The point is that the threat of ethical relativism depen ds less on truth than Blackburn supposes. Thus sensibility theorists can co unter ethical relativism in much the same way that quasi-realist projectivi sts can.