Rg. Harris et N. Schmitt, Strategic export policy with foreign direct investment and import substitution (vol 62, pg 85, 2000), J DEV ECON, 64(1), 2001, pp. 291
The paper examines discretionary and strategic foreign direct investment (F
DI) incentives in the export sector relative to a non-interventionist polic
y. The analysis is based on a two-country model with both countries seeking
to attract FDI. Countries differ in cost levels and in their levels of tar
iff protection on intermediate inputs. A shift in the trade policy regime t
oward the strategic promotion of exports results in a decrease in FDI alloc
ated to the low-cost country when it has a low level of protection on inter
mediate inputs, and an increase in Fl)I when it has a high level of protect
ion on intermediates inputs. Furthermore, even if FDI increases with export
policy activism relative to non-intervention, welfare may be lower. (C) 20
01 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: O12; F12;
F13; F23.