The public's vicinage right: A constitutional argument

Again and again in notorious criminal trials, courts neglect significant pu blic interests by transferring the trial out of the community in which the crime was committed. The acquittal of the officers who shot Amidou Diallo r eflects but the latest of a number of high-profile verdicts in which the ch ange of venue undermined the verdict's legitimacy, particularly within the community victimized by the crime. American law always has presumed that ju rors must be drawn from within the victimized community in order to permit the jury to fulfill its representative and adjudicative functions. Local ju rors stamp the community's judgment on the verdict, permit the trial to ser ve as an outlet for community concern, and interpret ambiguous statutory te rms in light of the common sense of the community. These essential jury fun ctions were understood by the Founders, yet they wholly are absent from the prevailing law governing change of venue motions. In this Article, Steven Engel argues that the public enjoys a constitutional right to adjudicate cr iminal trials locally. Ne first examines a series of cases in the 1980s whe re the Supreme Court recognized that the public enjoys a right of access to criminal proceedings premised on the tradition of public access, the publi c interest in publicity, and the link between the right and established con stitutional values. He then suggests that the public's "vicinage right" gro ws from the same soil as does the public's right of access, has longstandin g roots in our legal tradition, continues to serve important public policie s, and is implicit in other constitutional doctrines protecting the jury ri ght. Engel concludes that recognizing such a public right would encourage c ourts to explore alternatives to transfers that would preserve the defendan t's right to an impartial jury without damaging the community interests imp licit in the trial by jury.