A critique of methodological reason

In this essay, we argue that, following their perception of practices in th e natural sciences, the social sciences have reified methodology, making it the chief imperative of social investigation and using it to ground their knowledge claims. We find this to be the case even in the work of social sc ientists who try to overcome or reject the dominant positivist paradigm. We argue that this obsession with method has led the social sciences to aband on thinking-beyond-the-given in favor of small, specialized studies whose j ustification is no longer substantive but methodology driven. After a revie w of the history of the role of method in traditional philosophies of scien ce, the essay turns to the work of recent critics of social science who hav e become increasingly dissatisfied with modeling the social sciences after the natural ones. We distinguish between a hermeneutic and phenomenological critique of positivism, both of which, we argue, end up reproducing the sc ientism they reject. We identify this problem in our careful readings of so me of the most influential critics of Popperian scientific philosophy. In t he final section, we distinguish between contemporary social science, situa ted in what we term the epistemological paradigm, and our own critical scie nce, stemming from an alternate, ontohistorical tradition in the history of ideas. Here, we begin to lay out what a critical, nonmethodology-driven, r eflective and historical science might look like.