Evidence of market integration and price competition support a policy
of price deregulation and open access in the electric power industry.
The objective of this paper is to test the hypotheses that wholesale e
lectricity submarkets in the Pacific Northwest region of the WSCC are
integrated, and price competition exists within these integrated subma
rkets. To this end, we apply a bivariate cointegration test, a price-d
ifference test and a causality test to the 1996 on-peak daily electric
ity prices of four submarkets in the Pacific Northwest of North Americ
a: Mid-Columbia and California-Oregon Border (COB) in the Western US,
and BC/US Border and Alberta Power Pool in Western Canada. The price-d
ifference test results support the hypothesis that the following pairs
of markets are integrated: (a) BC/US Border and Mid-Columbia; (b) BC/
US Border and COB; and (c) Mid-Columbia and COB. A comparison between
the gross profit from price arbitrage and the posted transmission tari
ff indicates that price competition prevails in these market pairs, an
d the causality test results provide supporting evidence that price le
adership does not exist in these three market pairs. Finally, a market
-share analysis indicates that B.C. Hydro does not have market power i
n the aggregate market comprising BC/US Border, Mid-Columbia and COB.