Remarks on the unknown key share attacks

Authors
Citation
J. Baek et K. Kim, Remarks on the unknown key share attacks, IEICE T FUN, E83A(12), 2000, pp. 2766-2769
Citations number
13
Categorie Soggetti
Eletrical & Eletronics Engineeing
Journal title
IEICE TRANSACTIONS ON FUNDAMENTALS OF ELECTRONICS COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTER SCIENCES
ISSN journal
09168508 → ACNP
Volume
E83A
Issue
12
Year of publication
2000
Pages
2766 - 2769
Database
ISI
SICI code
0916-8508(200012)E83A:12<2766:ROTUKS>2.0.ZU;2-H
Abstract
This letter points out some flaws in the previous works on UKS (unknown key -share) attacks. We show that Blake-Wilson and Menezes' revised STS-MAC (St ation-to-Station Message Authentication Code) protocol [4]. which was propo sed to prevent UKS attack, is still vulnerable to a new UKS attack. Also. H irose and Yoshida's key agreement protocol [8] presented at PKC'98 is shown to be insecure against public key substitution UKS attacks. Finally, we di scuss countermeasures for such UKS attacks.