Responsibility, passion, and sin - A reassessment of Peter Abelard's ethics

This article reassesses Peter Abelard's account of moral intention,or, bett er, consent, in light of recent work on his own thought and on the twelfth- century background of that thought. The author argues (1) that Abelard's fo cus on consent as the determining factor for morality does not rule out, bu t, on the contrary, presupposes objective criteria for moral judgment and ( 2) that Abelard's real innovation does not lie in his doctrine of consent a s the sole source of merit or guilt, but, rather, in his exploration of the ways in which this doctrine affects our understanding of the objective cri teria for moral judgment. In particular, Abelard is led by his doctrine of consent to a thoroughgoing reassessment of the moral significance of the pa ssions, which, in turn, leads him to reject the view that actions should be evaluated in terms of the praiseworthy or vicious character of the passion s they express.