On a reductionist analysis of William James's philosophy of religion

William James undertook to steer his way between a rationalistic system tha t was not empirical enough and an empirical system so materialistic that it could not account for the value commitments on which it rested. In arguing against both the absolutists (gnostics) and the empiricists (agnostics), h e defined a position of pluralistic moralism that seemed equally distant fr om both, leaving himself vulnerable to the criticism that he had rescued mo rality from scientism only by reducing religion to morals. Such criticism, however, ignores distinctions James made between religion and theology and between monistic theology and dualistic theology. When these distinctions a re taken into account, it becomes evident that James can be criticized for reducing religion to morality only from the point of view of either absolut e monism or religious humanism and that radical empiricism not only embrace s a significant number of nonmoral religious experiences but also leaves op en the possibility of belief in the particular historical God of traditiona l Christianity.