A folk theorem for asynchronously repeated games

Authors
Citation
K. Yoon, A folk theorem for asynchronously repeated games, ECONOMETRIC, 69(1), 2001, pp. 191-200
Citations number
6
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
ECONOMETRICA
ISSN journal
00129682 → ACNP
Volume
69
Issue
1
Year of publication
2001
Pages
191 - 200
Database
ISI
SICI code
0012-9682(200101)69:1<191:AFTFAR>2.0.ZU;2-A
Abstract
We prove a Folk Theorem for asynchronously repeated games in which the set of players who can move in period t, denoted by I,, is a random variable wh ose distribution is a function of the past action choices of the players an d the past realizations of I-tau's, tau = 1, 2,...,t-1. We impose a conditi on, the finite periods of inaction (FPI) condition, which requires that the number of periods in which every player has at least one opportunity to mo ve is bounded. Given the FPI condition together with the standard nonequiva lent utilities (NEU) condition, we show that every feasible and strictly in dividually rational payoff vector can be supported as a subgame perfect equ ilibrium outcome of an asynchronously repeated game.