When norms normalize: The case of genetic "enhancement"

As the possibility of genetic intervention becomes more concrete, defining and regulating ethically permissible interventions must include a considera tion of the implicit as web as explicit consequences. These include the mor al implications of defining "enhancement" by reference to a standard of nor mality. Some authors have called into question the standard ethical concern s about genetic enhancement, but the distinction between enhancing and ther apeutic interventions is still structured as relatively unproblematic. Howe ver, determining the boundary between therapy and enhancement will have fee dback effects on the socially implemented definitions of what counts as nor mal in human embodiment. Positioning the interface between permissible and nonpermissible interventions at the same place as the boundaries between th erapy and enhancement, and between normal and abnormal embodiment, (1) uses biology to justify a moral evaluation, (2) privileges the single standpoin t of the genetically canonical person, and (3) enhances the dichotomy betwe en "normal" and "not normal." Assuming that the limit of permissibility alo ng the interventional continuum is coterminous with the definitions of enha ncement and of normality, distracts from the work of uncovering the real gr ounds to setting limits to genetic manipulation.