Rule power or power rules?: State behaviour after the reform of the GATT/WTO dispute settlement mechanism

The author explores whether the reform of the GATT/WTO dispute settlement m echanism in 1995 has led to changes in the behaviour of the members in trad e disputes. He concludes that there has been a change from a power-oriented behaviour towards a more rule-oriented one. The number of disputes has inc reased in spite of a low conflict level, and this can by far be explained b y the rise in the number of members and rules. The members have so far tend ed to implement within a reasonable period of time the recommendations and rulings by the Dispute Settlement Council of the WTO. This was not the case in the past. After 1995, the members tend to avoid unilateralism, and weak er states are able to make the stronger states change policies after compla ints. Power and rules are by no means opposite elements in a GATT/ WTO context. T he rules that affect behaviour have not come into existence in a power vacu um. They have developed through strategic exercise of power. Through the di spute settlement mechanism reform, strong states have secured legitimacy fo r their pressure on developing countries to lower trade barriers. Developin g countries that are able to utilise the mechanism at all, have secured a m ore level playing-field in their disputes with stronger counterparts.