ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUP ALLOCATIONS IN OPEN-SEAT SENATE ELECTIONS

Most studies of political action committees (PACs) focus on the incumb ent-oriented contribution strategies of PACs, whereas contributions to open-seat candidates remain relatively unexplored. Based on the assum ption that open-seat candidates have an insatiable need for campaign m oney, we model the allocations of PACs to open-seat senate candidates from 1980 to 1994. The results. of our analyses indicate that allocati ons in open-seat senate elections are more partisan than those in incu mbent elections, although incumbent-like effects are evident in alloca tions by corporate, labor, and trade association PACs, which largely s upport aspirant House of Representatives members who have previously e xisting connections to monied interests. Unlike the bipartisan behavio r exhibited by investor PACs in open house races, labor and investor i nterests reinforce the partisan divisions in senate contests by engagi ng in competitive funding of opposing candidates.