Moods have global and profound effects on our thoughts, motivations and beh
avior. To understand human behavior and cognition fully, we must understand
moods. In this paper I critically examine and reject the methodology of co
nventional 'cognitive theories' of affect. I lay the foundations of a new t
heory of moods that identifies them with processes of our cognitive functio
nal architecture. Moods differ fundamentally from some of our other affecti
ve states and hence require distinct explanatory tools. The computational t
heory of mood I propose places them within the context of other mental phen
omena and is consistent with the empirical data on moods.
1 Introduction
2 nle affective spectrum
3 Why the conventional approach cannot explain moods
4 The computational theory of moods
5 The foundations for a new theory of moods
5.1 That moods are cognitively impenetrable
5.2 That moods are operations of the functional architecture
6 Conclusion.