Varieties of propensity

Authors
Citation
D. Gillies, Varieties of propensity, BR J PHIL S, 51(4), 2000, pp. 807-835
Citations number
25
Categorie Soggetti
Multidisciplinary,Multidisciplinary,Philosiphy
Journal title
BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
ISSN journal
00070882 → ACNP
Volume
51
Issue
4
Year of publication
2000
Pages
807 - 835
Database
ISI
SICI code
0007-0882(200012)51:4<807:VOP>2.0.ZU;2-7
Abstract
The propensity interpretation of probability was introduced by Popper ([195 7]), but has subsequently been developed in different ways by quite a numbe r of philosophers of science. This paper does not attempt a complete survey , but discusses a number of different versions of the theory, thereby givin g some idea of the varieties of propensity. propensity. Propensity theories are classified into (i) long-run and (ii) single-case. The paper argues Fo r a long-run version of the propensity theory, but this is contrasted with two single-case propensity theories, one due to Miller and the later Popper , and the other to Fetter. The three approaches are compared by examining h ow they deal with a key problem for the propensity approach, namely the rel ationship between propensity and causality and Humphreys' paradox. 1 Introduction 2 Popper's first version of the propensity theory 3 Can there be objective probabilities of single events? 4 A classification of propensity theories 5 The propensity theories of Miller and the later Popper, and of Fetzer 6 Propensity and causality: Humphreys' paradox.