The propensity interpretation of probability was introduced by Popper ([195
7]), but has subsequently been developed in different ways by quite a numbe
r of philosophers of science. This paper does not attempt a complete survey
, but discusses a number of different versions of the theory, thereby givin
g some idea of the varieties of propensity. propensity. Propensity theories
are classified into (i) long-run and (ii) single-case. The paper argues Fo
r a long-run version of the propensity theory, but this is contrasted with
two single-case propensity theories, one due to Miller and the later Popper
, and the other to Fetter. The three approaches are compared by examining h
ow they deal with a key problem for the propensity approach, namely the rel
ationship between propensity and causality and Humphreys' paradox.
1 Introduction
2 Popper's first version of the propensity theory
3 Can there be objective probabilities of single events?
4 A classification of propensity theories
5 The propensity theories of Miller and the later Popper, and of Fetzer
6 Propensity and causality: Humphreys' paradox.