The 1997 collapse of the Albanian economy caused by the collapse of economy
-wide Ponzi schemes contrasts sharply to its success status as a post-Socia
list transition country in the years 1992-96. In this paper, an attempt is
made to explain this 'Albanian Paradox'. The specific Albanian conditions f
or the growth of Ponzi schemes are identified. Theoretically, the Albanian
Paradox can be interpreted as one version of the 'Financial Instability Hyp
othesis' suggested by Minsky. Investigation of the underlying factors that
render financial markets fragile suggests that the Albanian case is extreme
but not unique in the region. It is emphasised that sustainable growth is
predicated on the quality of government, on proper financial-sector regulat
ion, on actual microeconomic restructuring and on the development of market
institutions through which adequate market information is disseminated.