Intergovernmental grants and the positioning of presidential primaries andcaucuses: Empirical evidence from the 1992, 1996, and 2000 election cycles

The present study tests the theory that states can impact the size of the g rants they receive (per capita) from the federal government by becoming piv otal players in the federal electoral (primary/caucus) process. That is, by rearranging their presidential primary and caucus dates, states can play a n important role in determining the field of candidates for the two major p olitical parties in the United States. States are then likely to be rewarde d within the budgetary process at the federal level, which begins with the executive branch. Results ft om a simultaneous equation system suggest that the impact of the average movement of primaries/caucuses in the sample per iod (10.36 days closer to I January) results in an increase of federal gran ts of $362 million to $1.2 billion lover a two-year period) for the average stare, These results are consistent with the current pattern in the Americ an political process of more front-ended presidential primaries and caucuse s. (JEL D72, H11, H72, H77).