Recent debates about the values and virtues of the sciences have been marke
d by philosophical errors and misunderstandings among both the supporters a
nd the critics of the value of science. Some authors, such as Wilson defend
ing the ultimate value of science and Appleyard decrying the influences of
scientific modes of thinking, both assume the positivistic stance to unders
tanding science. Others, such as Dawkins, Maddox and Wolpert, come through
as scientific realists, celebrating the power of science to reach beyond wh
at can be perceived. Yet all three neglect the role of instruments and appa
ratus and miss the importance of the part that social forces play in the cr
eation of belief. Finally Maddox slips into assuming that the only truly sc
ientific approach to understanding human life scientifically is to follow t
he pattern of realism and model making as it is exemplified int he physical
sciences. Psychology can be scientific without being reductionist.