Intention is often referred to as a pure cognitive-psychological process an
s as a property needed to consciously control behavior. We assume that inte
ntional goals can be used to control movement coordination and we developed
a theoretical framework to understand the relationship between intention a
nd action. We advocate that the non linear dynamical system approach to mov
ement coordination may prove to be particularly useful in helping understan
d hoe intention and, more generally cognition contribute to the control of
action. We suggest that intention residues within the self-organizing dynam
ics of behavior, forming an indissociable part of such dynamics, rather tha
n as an autonomous ontologically distinct and prescriptive driving system a
s presented in Seller's studies. Such an approach differs markedly from the
one advocated by Seller because it proposes that the key to understanding
intention is to study intention in action as opposed to intention and actio
n. in action as opposed to intention and action.