A new solution to Cartwright's paradox

The paper offers a new solution to a paradox introduced by Richard Cartwrig ht and discussed by Kaplan. The paradox is, in a nutshell, as follows. Supp ose that we name with '(1)' the statement 'the last word of (1) is obscene, ' and with '(2)' the statement 'the last word of (1) is obscene.' It seems that, although under these stipulations (1) = (2), (2) has a modal property which (1) lacks, to wit: it can be turned into a truth by quoting its last word. But this seems to contradict Leibniz' Law. In offering a solution wh ich differs somehow from the one favored by Kaplan, I put to use proposals on the semantics of indexicals and proper names I have defended in previous works. To the extent that the solution improves on previous ones, it provi des partial confirmation for the semantic proposals it relies.