Truth and metaphor: A pragmatic approach

What does the (possible) truth of a metaphor consist of? The first part of this paper is a critical analysis of the following model: A metaphorical st atement is true if and only if it somehow leads to the recognition of liter al truths. This model of metaphorical truth as indirect literal truth is no t utterly inadequate, but it fails to account for certain central features of the metaphorical: the openness of the interpretation of living metaphors , the phenomenon of the so called metaphorical chains (or nets), the non-pr opositional aspects of many metaphors, and the active, creative role of the interpreter. In the second part I develop an alternative model, based on: a) a pragmatis t methodology with respect to the truth-issue in general (truth without rep resentation), b) Goodman's concept of rightness, c) the difference between saying and showing, and d) the idea, that a good metaphor creates a new con text which not only allows us to say something new concerning the topic in question, but which allows us to treat the topic in a new manner.