In April 1939, the European Union (EU) quickly agreed a Stability Pact for
South Eastern Europe as its main response to the Kosovo crisis and NATO's b
ombing campaign. A key element of the Pact was the offer of the perspective
of EU membership to all the countries of the region. This article aims to
explain why the EU, despite the fact that it was already struggling in Spri
ng 1999 to manage an existing membership queue of thirteen states, decided
to extend the membership perspective to yet another five countries. By trac
ing the negotiations which led to the Stability Pact, the article finds tha
t there were four essential pieces to this puzzle: crisis, path-dependency,
policy-framing and the institution of the EU Presidency. Finally, on the b
asis of the case study, the article points to a number of more general less
ons for the EU as a negotiating system.