Must we choose between the benefits of cooperative use of scarce resources
and our liberal commitments to autonomy and exit? No. Well-tailored law can
mediate between community and liberty, between commons and private propert
y. Our theory of the liberal commons provides a framework to reconcile thes
e seemingly contradictory moral imperatives and analytic categories In our
definition, an institution succeeds as a liberal commons when it enables a
limited group of people to capture the economic and social benefits from co
operation, while also ensuring autonomy to individuals through a secure rig
ht to exit. This Article shows how current theories and categories obscure
the most difficult tradeoffs in managing commons resources; then details ou
r liberal commons model comprising the decisionmaking spheres of individual
dominion, democratic self-governance, and cooperation-enhancing exit; and
finally presents a case study to show how our approach can enrich legal and
social inquiry.