The liberal commons

Citation
H. Dagan et Ma. Heller, The liberal commons, YALE LAW J, 110(4), 2001, pp. 549
Citations number
244
Categorie Soggetti
Law
Journal title
YALE LAW JOURNAL
ISSN journal
00440094 → ACNP
Volume
110
Issue
4
Year of publication
2001
Database
ISI
SICI code
0044-0094(200101)110:4<549:TLC>2.0.ZU;2-K
Abstract
Must we choose between the benefits of cooperative use of scarce resources and our liberal commitments to autonomy and exit? No. Well-tailored law can mediate between community and liberty, between commons and private propert y. Our theory of the liberal commons provides a framework to reconcile thes e seemingly contradictory moral imperatives and analytic categories In our definition, an institution succeeds as a liberal commons when it enables a limited group of people to capture the economic and social benefits from co operation, while also ensuring autonomy to individuals through a secure rig ht to exit. This Article shows how current theories and categories obscure the most difficult tradeoffs in managing commons resources; then details ou r liberal commons model comprising the decisionmaking spheres of individual dominion, democratic self-governance, and cooperation-enhancing exit; and finally presents a case study to show how our approach can enrich legal and social inquiry.